City of London wins appeal over intentional homelessness of tenant who moved from London to Brighton and then sought to return

In 2015 the respondent exchanged accommodation in London for a tenancy in Brighton granted by the Guinness Partnership.

He quickly regretted this and asked to move back saying that bank cards had been stolen from his new address while he was abroad.

Guinness advised it had nothing suitable available but in January 2016, the respondent formally gave four weeks' notice to end his tenancy, citing antisocial behaviour and stealing by other tenants.

He moved elsewhere but by 2023 applied to the City of London as homeless, It accepted he was homeless, eligible for assistance and had a priority need, but considered the respondent intentionally homeless under section 191 of the Housing Act 1996.

The respondent requested a review under section 202 of the 1996 Act and presented medical evidence.

He denied being intentionally homeless and said that he had to leave Brighton due to homophobic abuse from neighbours and the bank card theft.

A review officer at the City of London upheld the decision that the respondent was intentionally homeless and concluded the corporation did not owe him the main housing duty under section 193 of the 1996 Act.

The review officer accepted that the respondent had "a longstanding history of depression and anxiety with obsessive compulsive traits" and had been diagnosed with PTSD and had his bank cards stolen.

But he also noted the respondent had wanted to leave Brighton prior to the theft, and did not accept he had been abused as he claimed as he did not give the Guinness Partnership any details of antisocial or homophobic behaviour.

The respondent successfully took his objections to this review to the county court at central London.

Lord Justice Newey said the issues before him were: did the review officer apply the wrong test when considering whether the respondent was intentionally homeless; did he give insufficient reasons for departing from the views expressed by a mental health professional; did he comply with the public sector equality duty’?

Newey LJ said that even if a mental health problem was capable of negating ‘deliberateness’ without amounting to lack of capacity, “[the review officer] cannot be said to have applied a test that was adverse to [the respondent]…to the contrary, [the review officer] followed the [Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities] code”.

The judge said: “I have not been persuaded that, for mental illness to render an act or omission non-deliberate, the person must have lacked mental capacity.

“Neither, however, do I accept…that it suffices that a mental health problem played a significant role in the relevant act or omission. Neither the case law nor the code seems to me to lend any real support to that view and, as a matter of language, it appears to me that the fact that a mental health problem played a significant role in a decision need not mean that it was not taken ‘deliberately’.”

He said the review officer could not be criticised for not adopting the test of deliberateness favoured by the respondent’s lawyers and nor could it have been wrong for him to proceed by reference to the code’s guidance.

The judge found the review officer gave adequate reasons for his decision and followed the public sector equality duty.

Newey LJ allowed the City’s appeal and Zacaroli and Yip LJs both agreed.

Mark Smulian