Supreme Court dismisses appeal over how homelessness duty comes to an end

The issue in Bano, R. (on the application of) v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2026] UKSC 22 was whether Waltham Forest’s duty automatically came to an end upon the appellant, Mrs Bano, rejecting the offer or whether Waltham Forest was required to determine whether or not she had accepted the offer, formally decide that its duty had come to an end, and communicate that decision to her in order to end its duty.

The Supreme Court held that the duty came to an end at the point of Mrs Bano rejecting the offer.

The background to the case was that Waltham Forest had accepted that it owed Mrs Bano the main housing duty and offered her private rented sector accommodation in Derby, via an offer letter. It asked her to meet an agent at the flat in 2020, but she failed to attend.

Waltham Forest considered its duty to Mrs Bano ended at this point.

The main housing duty arises under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996, and section 193(7AA) provides that this duty ends automatically when an applicant accepts or refuses a compliant private rented sector offer.

Any challenge to suitability or to the authority’s reliance on the offer must be made through the statutory review route in section 202, which gives applicants 21 days to seek a review of that decision.

Mrs Bano issued an application for permission to bring judicial review against Waltham Forest, who opposed the application on the ground that she had had an alternative statutory remedy against them which she could have sought but did not.

Mrs Bano argued that the offer letter was not a decision that she could apply to review under section 202 and therefore she was entitled to bring a judicial review claim.

The High Court initially concluded that the main housing duty does not end automatically upon the applicant accepting or rejecting an offer of private rented sector accommodation, holding that the local authority must make a formal decision to end it.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the council’s appeal, holding that the main housing duty ended automatically upon Mrs Bano’s refusal.

It found that Mrs Bano could have requested a review both in relation to the offer letter and in relation to Waltham’s Forest conclusion or decisions set out in a later letter that its duty under section 193 had ceased.

Mrs Bano appealed. Shelter intervened, raising arguments in support of Mrs Bano.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, finding that Mrs Bano had a suitable alternative remedy by way of review under section 202 which precluded her claim for judicial review.

Lord Stephens and Lady Rose gave the judgment, with which Lord Reed, Lord Sales, and Lord Hamblen agreed.

Ground 1: On the true construction of section 193(7AA) is a decision required subsequent to the refusal of an offer?

The Supreme Court found that the clear meaning of the section is that if an applicant accepts a private rented sector offer, or refuses such an offer, then as a matter of law the local housing authority ceases to be subject to the main housing duty.

The local housing authority does not need to make a formal decision and does not need to notify the resident of the duty ending.

Lord Stephens and Lady Rose said that “if there were such a notification requirement, that might indicate that a decision was required at a subsequent stage, after the offer had been made and after the applicant had responded to it”.

The judges also found that the offer letter, provided it complies with the requirements in section 193(7), is itself the decision that the duty will cease to be owed once the applicant accepts or refuses the offer. Once the applicant receives that letter, they have 21 days to request a review of the decision using section 202.

Mrs Bano was notified of the decision by the letter and knew about the decision, which she could challenge by way of a review if she wished to do so.

Finally, Ground 1 was rejected on the basis that Mrs Bano’s construction of the decision process would lead to the potential of absurdity.

A local authority, for example, would continue to owe the applicant a duty in circumstances where, the applicant having accepted the offer of accommodation and lived there for years, the local authority omitted to notify the applicant that the main housing duty had come to an end.

The Supreme Court also rejected Mrs Bano and Shelter’s argument that procedural fairness required express notification of the local authority’s decision before the time for review starts.

Ground 2: was the Offer Letter a decision capable of being reviewed under section 202?

Lord Stephens and Lady Rose held that the offer letter was a decision that was amenable to review under section 202(1)(b) and (g) of the Housing Act.

The terms of the letter were very clear that the offer “will discharge our duty to you whether you accept or refuse”. The letter also went into considerable detail as to why Waltham Forest considered the offered accommodation suitable and told Mrs Bano that she would only receive that one offer.

The decision stands as a valid decision which brought the main housing duty to an end, the Supreme Court found.

Ground 3: letters sent to Mrs Bano or her solicitors after the Offer Letter

The final point of contention was whether any communication from Waltham Forest to Mrs Bano after the offer letter also constituted a decision which generated a right of review under section 202.

The Supreme Court decided that the Court of Appeal was wrong in deciding that subsequent communications from Waltham Forest could have triggered a request for a review, stating instead that “if an applicant is unaware of a decision when it is made then, upon becoming aware of it, the correct procedure is to apply for an extension of time in order to review the decision.

“There is no scope for confirmatory decisions to be amenable to review”.

Harry Rodd

This story was based on the Supreme Court’s press summary.