Council defeats High Court challenge to making of traffic regulation order

The High Court has found that Staffordshire County Council properly made a traffic order to which local farmers objected and that neither predetermination nor misinterpretation of a scheme of delegation were involved.

Mr Justice Eyre heard the case brought by farmers and equestrians Michael Daw, James Startin and Fleur Boulton.

In August 2020 Staffordshire issued a traffic regulation order that prohibited vehicles weighing more than 7.5 tonnes from making turns onto the A515 as a route to the main A38 and A50 roads.

The claimants all wished to use the A515 for agricultural vehicles or horseboxes and pressed unsuccessfully for an agricultural vehicles exemption.

By 2022, the council was considering a variation of the 2020 Order and carried out an informal consultation including on a possible agricultural exemption. But in February 2023, Staffordshire decided against this.

Eyre J said there was a dispute over who made this decision and when and on what basis.

Staffordshire said it was taken in February 2023 by Timothy Heminsley, its head of projects and technical services, while the claimants said it was made in August 2022 jointly by Mr Heminsley and two councillors for the area.

They said this meant the decision was made before the end of the consultation period and was either pre-determined or that the councillors involved had a veto.

The council said the decision was made by Mr Heminsley acting alone after the end of the consultation period and taking account of representations.

A second ground of challenge was that the decision was ultra vires, depending on whether the power to make it was lawfully delegated to Mr Heminsley and/or to him and the two councillors.

The council said that its constitution gave him power to make the decision, while the claimants said the constitution required the variation to be referred to the Planning Committee.

Eyre J took together grounds 1 and 4, which respectively claimed the consultation was unfair because of a failure conscientiously to take account of the representations and that there was improper pre-determination by Mr Heminsley and the councillors.

The judge noted the history of the case had become clearer as it progressed as material originally provided by Staffordshire to the claimants had contained redactions and “was in markedly defensive terms”.

He said: “I am satisfied that there was no malign intent behind this and it was an understandable response. However, it had the consequence that the claimants' concerns and suspicions were heightened rather than assuaged and that the full history was not initially apparent.”

Although there were some conflicting messages in a series of emails, Eyre J said: “I am satisfied that when the contemporaneous correspondence is seen as a whole and in context the position is clear.

“The decision was made by Mr Heminsley in February 2023 and was made as the result of his own judgement. It is clear that Mr Heminsley attached very considerable weight to the views expressed by Cllrs Jessel and Cox…but that weight was being attached to those views in the context of a determination being made by Mr Heminsley acting alone.” The judge found there was a lawful delegation to Mr Heminsley.

He turned to whether Mr Heminsley acted in accordance with the scheme as properly interpreted.

The claimants argued that if an objection from a councillor was made and not withdrawn the matter concerned must go to the Planning Committee.

Staffordshire emphasised “the need to read the provision realistically and in context”.

It said that the purpose was to give a councillor the right to have a proposal referred to the Planning Committee where officers were minded to proceed despite the councillor’s objection.

This meant an officer could not override an objection from a councillor but it did not preclude the acceptance of arguments against a proposal advanced by councillors and others.

Eyre J said: “I prefer the [council’s] interpretation. The claimants' reading of the provision is a possible one grammatically and linguistically but that advanced by the [council] does not do violence to the language used.

“More significant is the fact that the claimants' interpretation leads to an artificial and unrealistic result while that of the [council] accords with the context and purpose of the provision.”

The judge explained: “An officer can override objections which come from members of the public but not those from a councillor. An officer can also choose not to proceed with a proposal and can do so whether the objections causing the change of heart come from a councillor or a member of the public or both.

“It follows that Mr Heminsley was entitled to proceed as he did and to accept the councillors' objections provided he was persuaded of their merits.”

Eyre J also dismissed a ground argued that Staffordshire failed to provide accurate and adequate reasons for the decision.

The claimants said the true reason was the opposition of the two councillors to the exemption.

Staffordshire said this was wrong and the reasoning was both accurate and adequate.

The claimants further argued that the reasons given were not adequate because they failed to explain why an agricultural exemption was inappropriate.

The judge said: “The claimants' challenge has to be seen in the light of my conclusion that the decision was made by Mr Heminsley as an exercise of his judgement albeit attaching considerable weight to the representations from the councillors. Those representations were in reasoned terms and were part of the consultation. The conclusion was reached by reference to the matters advanced in the consultation and so was a conclusion reached having regard to particular factors.”

He added: “It is possible to criticise the drafting of almost any set of reasons when the same are subjected to detailed analysis by teams of lawyers after the event. The requirements are, however, intelligibility and adequacy and the reasons given here were both intelligible and adequate.”

Mark Smulian