Supreme Court agrees to hear subsidy control appeal over loans by combined authority to property group

The background to the case is that Weis is seeking to challenge two loan agreements entered into by the combined authority in November 2024 with special purpose vehicles that were part of the Renaker Group. 

Both are beneficially owned by another property developer, Daren Whitaker.

The Renaker loans were to finance the construction of two high-rise residential blocks in Manchester and were made from a fund called the Greater Manchester Housing Investment Loan Fund, the primary objective of which was the creation of new homes in the Manchester area.

By an application to the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) in June 2024, before the Renaker loans had been entered into but after the GMCA’s decision to approve the loans on 22 March 2024, Mr Weis sought a review of the making of the Renaker loans on the basis that they constituted an unlawful subsidy within the meaning of the Subsidy Control Act 2022 in that they did not comply with the 'Commercial Market Operator' (CMO) principle found in s.3(2) of the 2022 Act.

The CAT dismissed Mr Weis’ application in its judgment dated 24 July 2025.

Mr Weis appealed to the Court of Appeal and his appeal was dismissed by a judgment handed down on 29 June 2026.

He subsequently applied to the Supreme Court for permission to appeal on three grounds: 

1. Section 3(2): Judicial Review or Precedent Fact? The argument is that the Court of Appeal was wrong to treat the s.3(2) CMO question as an objective question for the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) to determine for itself, including by reference to evidence and reasons produced after the decision. Mr Weis says instead that the public authority must decide whether the s.3(2) test is satisfied, and the CAT's role is conventional judicial review of that decision based on the material before the authority at the time of the decision.
2. The CAT's jurisdiction to consider public-law grounds of claim. Mr Weis argues that the Court of Appeal was wrong to hold that free-standing public-law challenges fall outside the CAT's jurisdiction and must instead be brought separately in the Administrative Court. His case is that s.70 of the Subsidy Control Act gives the CAT jurisdiction over public-law complaints concerning the process by which the allegedly subsidising financial assistance was conferred.
3. Financial viability of the developments. Mr Weis argues that the Court of Appeal was wrong to uphold the CAT's treatment of the alleged inconsistency between Mr Whitaker's position on viability when obtaining the loans and his position when seeking exemption from affordable-housing requirements. In particular, the Financial Viability Assessments represented that the developments would not be viable even with the affordable-housing requirement waived, yet the combined authority had not taken those assessments into account when making/pricing the loans.

On 30 October a panel comprising Lord Reed, Lady Rose and Lord Snowden granted permission on grounds 1 and 2. However, they decided that the third ground did not raise an arguable point of law of general public importance.