Caravan site licensing and planning control

The Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Haytop Country Park Ltd v Amber Valley Borough Council [2025] EWCA Civ 1442 provides useful clarification on the relationship between planning control and caravan site licensing, which is governed by the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 (“the 1960 Act”). The judgment brings welcome clarity to an area where there had previously been ambiguity over the interaction of the statutory frameworks. In this case, that interaction saw the operator relying on licensing conditions to bypass the requirements of the planning system.

In giving the leading judgment, Holgate LJ – with whom the other judges agreed – was clear: site licensing cannot be used to circumvent planning restrictions or to undermine enforcement notices. Instead, licensing must work “in harmony” with the planning regime, respecting both historic permissions and conclusions reached through enforcement appeal processes.

Background and procedural history

The case concerns a long-running dispute over the lawful extent and configuration of Haytop Country Park. The site benefits from two historic planning permissions: a 1952 Permission and a more detailed 1966 Permission, which allowed for up to 60 caravans on the site, and prescribed the layout, density, spacing, and the permitted areas of siting for those caravans. A 1968 Licence, granted under section 3 of the 1960 Act, reflected the terms of the 1966 Permission. In 1978 a tree preservation order (‘the TPO’) was granted in respect of some of the trees on the Site.

From 2017 the Appellant unlawfully felled 121 trees in the area protected by the TPO, and carried out engineering works on the Site. Amber Valley Council (‘the Council’) the Respondents in this matter took enforcement action.

In 2019, the Council issued further enforcement proceedings alleging breaches of development control, one of which was appealed. In August 2021, a Planning Inspector dismissed the appeal. The Appellant appealed the Inspector’s decision to the High Court which, was dismissed in 2022.

In 2021 the Council served a tree replacement notice under section 207 of the Town and Country Planning Act (‘the 1990 Act’). This tree replacement notice was also appealed, and was upheld by an Inspector in 2024.

In 2022 the Appellant applied for a new site licence for 30 residential caravans. It relied upon the fact that, once the licence was granted, the permitted development rights would accrue pursuant to Class B of Part 5 of Schedule 2 to the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development)(England) Order 2015 would confer planning permission upon those acts which were at the time the target of the enforcement action.

The Council granted a site licence (‘the 2022 Licence’), but it permitted only three caravans, located in the areas of the site which the Council considered would not interfere with the steps required by the extant enforcement and tree replacement notices.

Haytop appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) (‘the FTT’) arguing that the matters on which the Council relied when issuing the 2022 Licence – specifically, the enforcement notice and the tree replacement notice were impermissible under the terms of the legislation. In July 2023 the FTT allowed the Appellant’s appeal, to the extent that it ordered the Council to issue a site caravan licence for 18 caravans. It rejected the Appellant’s submission that the authorisation of the site licence should disregard the requirements of the tree replacement notice, but accepted that the determination should not have regard to the requirements of the enforcement notice against the unlawful engineering operations.

The Council appealed to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (‘the UTT’) which reversed the FTT’s decision. Judge Cooke held that

• The appellant was seeking to benefit from its own unlawful activities by seeking a site licence the effect of which could be to legitimise that wrong without the application of any scrutiny on planning grounds. As a matter of principle, the appellant should not be allowed that advantage.
• All major planning issues should be resolved before any decision to issue a site licence.
• The Inspector in 2021 had identified the planning issues to be resolved to establish a planning baseline, but the FTT’s decision permitted a licence which was inconsistent with that baseline and the class B rights which the grant of a licence would consequently confer.
• The FTT’s approach was irrational. It was not “unduly burdensome” for the Council to limit the site licence so as to be consistent with the operational development enforcement notice and the tree replacement notice.
• The fact that those were planning considerations did not render the Council’s approach to the site licence unlawful.

The Appellant appealed the UTT’s decision to the Court of Appeal, arguing that:

• As an enforcement notice must be directed to the breach of planning control specified, it cannot remove existing planning rights, including permitted development rights. It would, therefore, be irrational for the Council to enforce against the removal of development which could immediately be put back using permitted development rights, once a licence was granted.
• Permitted development rights are prospective. They authorise development which has yet to take place. An enforcement notice is directed against development which has already occurred and cannot prevent reliance in the future upon permitted development rights.
• Accordingly, the Upper Tribunal erred in law in finding that it was irrational for a site licence to authorise caravan plots giving rise to Class B rights which were inconsistent with the operational development enforcement notice. The ability of a subsequent decision to allow development inconsistent with an enforcement notice is inherent in planning legislation and the relationship of the 1960 Act with that regime. Whether land can be used as a caravan site depends upon the grant of planning permission (or a lawful development certificate). A site licence under the 1960 Act usually controls “the details” of the use of a site and gives rise to permitted development rights for development required by the site licence conditions. That allows for flexibility and the upgrading of facilities over time without having to make planning applications.
• Conditions may only be imposed on a site licence under the 1960 Act for site licensing purposes and not for purely planning purposes. The issues underlying the enforcement notice were planning not site licensing matters.

The Court rejected these arguments comprehensively, providing authoritative guidance on the limits of site licensing and the correct interpretation of Class B rights. A summary of the Court’s reasoning is set out below.

• There is no irrationality in licensing fewer caravans than historic permissions nominally allow. Historic permissions must be read as a whole, including conditions specifying where caravans may be placed. Sites may be subject to broader constraints, such as tree preservation orders, which reduce in practice the number of caravans a site can accommodate. This fact is reflected in the Appellant’s own applications which did not seek permission for the full 60 caravans. [77]
• Haytop’s reliance on future Class B PD rights assumes, without justification, that the licence will be granted in the form it seeks. Class B rights arise only if the licence requires certain works. Therefore, the argument is circular: whether those rights arise is the very question the licensing authority must determine. [78, 81]
• Enforcement notices have continuing and prospective effect, per section 181 of the 1990 Act. It can only be overridden by the grant of planning permission. Breaches cannot be authorised through the site licensing regime. The Mansi principle is not relevant. [79-82]
• The FTT erred by disregarding the enforcement notice and planning baseline in an attempt to avoid “regulatory duplication”. The 1960 Act requires that an applicant hold an express planning permission (not PD rights) for use as a caravan site. Licensing is therefore inherently connected to planning; planning cannot be treated as irrelevant. Avoiding duplication depends on statutory design. Here, the statutory scheme deliberately intertwines licensing and planning. [87]
• Within that context, licensing cannot enlarge the scope of a planning permission. Each of the 1952 and 1966 Permissions had to be read as a whole, including the conditions to which they were subject (per Barton Park). This whole is what must be considered when interpreting the provision at section 3(3) of the 1960 Act.  [87]
• The Court explicitly rejected Lord Denning’s obiter in Esdell which suggested that planning determines only the principle of use, while licensing  determined numbers. Instead it preferred the reasoning in the Scottish case Cartledge, which accorded with Crittenden when it determined that a site licence has to be “in harmony, and not in conflict, with the terms of the planning permission relied upon to satisfy the precondition in section 3(3) of the 1960 Act. While a licence can impose tighter obligations or restrictions than those in the permission, it cannot enlarge the permission or relax its requirements. [96-97]
• The Appellant’s “purely planning” argument leads to absurdity. If the grant of a licence depends on the planning permission that underpins it. Treating planning as a “separate sphere” would detach licensing from the statutory precondition for issuing the licence. Parliament cannot have intended the regimes to operate independently. [96]
• To that extent a site licensing authority setting the conditions of the site licence does take into account something which may be based solely on planning considerations, namely the terms and effect of the planning permission which is the pre-requisite for the grant of that licence. But that is unobjectionable. It is simply what the statutory scheme requires. [98]
• Accordingly, an operator seeking to exceed planning limits must apply for a new planning permission. [108]

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s decision firmly establishes that caravan site licensing under the 1960 Act cannot be used to bypass or undermine planning controls. Licensing must operate in harmony with planning permissions and enforcement notices, reinforcing the principle that planning permissions, including their conditions and limitations, set the definitive boundaries for site operations. This ruling closes loopholes which might have allowed operators to leverage licensing conditions or Class B permitted development rights to circumvent enforcement actions or expand site capacity.

For local authorities, it reinforces the primacy of planning control in managing caravan site development, empowering them to ensure compliance with enforcement requirements.

For site operators, it underscores the necessity of securing appropriate planning permissions before seeking to extend or alter site usage. Further, in instances such as this, the route out of protracted enforcement proceedings is more likely to be a sensibly framed application for permission than years of litigation.

Overall, the judgment provides crucial legal clarity, preserving the integrity of planning enforcement and preventing regulatory duplication or conflict, thereby strengthening the coordinated operation of planning and licensing regimes.

Anna Stein is a barrister at No5 Barristers Chambers.