Section 289 appeals and relief from sanctions

In Singhal UK Ltd v SSHCLG [2026] EWHC 2685 (Admin) the High Court has refused to grant relief from sanctions in applications for permission to appeal under s.289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, bringing to an end Singhal UK Ltd’s appeal against an enforcement notice issued by LB Hounslow in 2014.

An Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State had redetermined and dismissed the applicants’ appeal against the enforcement notice by a decision letter dated 23 July 2026. On 20 August 2026, the applicants attempted to appeal to the High Court under s.289, but made a number of procedural errors, necessitating an application for relief from sanctions. David Elvin KC, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, refused the application for relief from sanctions and set aside the applications for permission to appeal as the Court had no jurisdiction to determine them.

The procedural requirements for bringing a s.289 appeal are set out in CPR PD 54D. The Judge held that the applicants failed to serve the Secretary of State with copies of the documents under para. 6.4, as was required by para. 6.3. While some of the required documents were served on the Secretary of State on 21 August 2026, the witness statements required by para 6.4(c) were only served with the application for relief from sanctions on 14 October 2026. The Judge accepted that the applications for permission to appeal under s.289 were not valid applications as there had not been compliance with PD 54D. In doing so, he said that no allowance should be granted to the applicants as litigants in person.

In considering the applicants relief from sanctions application, the Judge applied the familiar three-stage Denton test from Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 3926 and concluded that the circumstances advanced did not justify relief. He said that the prejudice that would be caused to the public interest by the loss of the ability of the Secretary of State and LB Hounslow to rely on the 28-day time limit, and the consequent invalidity of the s.289 applications, supported the refusal of relief. He further said that there was no requirement for the Secretary of State to notify the applicants of their errors.

As to the merits of the appeals, the Judge noted that in most cases the merits of the substantive application would be unlikely to be relevant: only in cases where the court can see that without much investigation that the grounds of appeal are either very strong or very weak will the merits have a particular part to play (Hysaj v SSHD [2015] 1 WLR 3926). He said that in the particular circumstances of the case he arguably needed to consider an argument on statutory ground (e) in more detail, but that the merits of this ground were very weak, as were the merits of the remaining grounds, which he had not considered in detail.

While relief from sanctions applications must be determined on their own merits, the judgment of the High Court demonstrates the need to comply with procedural requirements. It is the latest in a number of judgments that where the Courts have shown an unwillingness to tolerate procedural breaches. In the context of planning cases, the time limits are particular tight – six weeks for judicial review and s.288 applications, and just 28 days for s.289 applications – and the procedural requirements are different for each. In this case, a planning enforcement appeal that had lasted more than a decade came to an end as the result of procedural failures.

Howard Leithead of No5 Chambers represented the Secretary of State and is a member of the Attorney General’s B Panel of London Counsel. In addition to the Secretary of State, he represents developers, local planning authorities and others, and appears regularly in the High Court.