Intervention: the Monitoring Officer’s view

The purpose of this article is to highlight the need for inclusion of consideration of the pivotal role of the Monitoring Officer in a local authority response to statutory intervention.

19 March 2026 saw published Lessons Learnt from Best Value Interventions [2025] (Lessons) a reflective report, jointly written by the Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) and Verian[i].

I looked first to the literature review. This is a good place to start to see what’s been written by peers and it gives the reader a framework to measure the span and scope of the research. The immediate point that came to mind was absence of any meaningful narrative about the Statutory Governance Officers and their view as the governance team. I define that to mean the Head of the Paid Service[ii], the Chief Finance Officer[iii] (AKA s.151) and the Monitoring Officer[iv] who form the ‘Golden Triangle’.

Well, to save readers the time, it’s just not mentioned at all and the ‘Monitoring Officer’ only once in the main body and a repetition in Appendix D. It said:

6.23 Indeed, where this was the case, a common recovery response during or following an intervention was the replacement of both political leadership and senior officers. A change in leadership was explicitly mentioned as an enabler for some (7) interventions where leadership and governance were original drivers for failure. This included changing the Chief Executive and strengthening the senior management teams, such as the Section 151 and Monitoring Officers. In 9 interventions, best value experts had advised a change of managerial leadership as part of the intervention. This often resulted in fresh mindset and momentum.

That’s it. The Monitoring Officer role is not even discussed. Yet in 2024 a great deal of work by Solace, CIPFA and LLG[v] was carried out to jointly publish a guidance document for working together for the object of ‘securing superior governance in local government’ namely ‘The Code of Practice on Good Governance for Local Authority Statutory Officers’. The Code has had a big impact already[vi].

I know how hard Lawyers in Local Government have worked on raising the profile of the key role of the Monitoring Officer. Indeed, SOLACE and CIPFA fully recognise it.

Furthermore, Local Government Lawyer consistently works to publish freely available invaluable commentary on the practice of local government law. Yet in this research there is not one citation from LGL, though inexplicably one can find a reference to an academic paper from Iran[vii]’, which in the current international climate with respect to the authors, is not a place that immediately conjures up to mind for sound governance.

Given that leadership, governance and culture are significant key success factors to a well-run local authority, then their view as a team is crucial as to both causes and recovery.

It looks like that the framing of the paper was set by MHCLG (see Lessons para 4.1) and that was to focus on Chief Executive(s) and Council Leader(s) even though the theme of governance was clearly identified as the prime cause of failure, not that the S.151 officer’s opinions appears to have informed much either see:

2.25 Cohort of interviewees from councils: This was focused on the senior leader apex of the organisations, so Chief Executives and Leaders/Elected Mayors were targeted, not the whole senior management team of the council. In some cases, the Chief Finance Officer was included at the council’s request.

The comment at para 4.6 recognises governance:

4.6 Published literature consistently identifies governance, leadership, and cultural (GLC) weakness as central factors in best value failure. This research also provides insights into the role of governance, leadership, and culture as drivers of failure.

Indeed fig 13 lists Governance as the foremost (‘18’ instances) of the 24 councils’ cause for intervention.

Local Auditors are not discussed either which is most surprising because while governance is a prime cause of failure, improper administration of finances is the most serious manifestation of it for the sums being hundreds of millions of pounds such as for example Woking or Thurrock.

Reports or notices under Section 24 and Schedule 7 of the Audit and Accountability Act 2014 by the Local Auditor can be a precursor to intervention. Furthermore, we should also take into account the pivotal role of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 Section 114 Report by the Chief Financial Officer.

So why no meaningful input from Monitoring Officers? It has got be due to not having Monitoring officers being consulted or invited to be a focus group which referring to Appendix C lists SOLACE and CIPFA but not local government lawyers particularly the Monitoring Officers, it is clearly a glaring omission.

Last word

So, does the lack of a contribution from Monitoring Officers invalidate the lessons from intervention? Well, the best way to put it is, that the MHCLG needs to re-open the learning process and talk to Lawyers in Local Government and so finish the job because they are worth listening to.

Dr Paul Feild is a Principal Standards & Governance Solicitor. In 2015 he was awarded Doctor of Business Administration on the thesis which asked ‘How does Localism for Standards Work in Practice? The Practitioner’s View of Local Standards Post Localism Act 2011’. He has been a deputy Monitoring Officer in various public authorities since 2000 and researches and writes on finance and governance issues. He can be contacted This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.. His opinions as ever are his own.

^[i] https://localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/governance/396-governance-news/100047-governance-failures-most-common-challenge-in-best-value-interventions-report-finds

^[ii] S.4 Local Government and Housing Act 1989.

^[iii] S.151 Local Government Act 1972

^[iv] S.5 Local Government and Housing Act 1989

^[v] And work of Philip McCourt of Bevan Brittan

^[vi] It now can be found in Job Descriptions for Monitoring Officers.

^[vii] Ravaghi, H., Mannion, R. And Sajadi, H. (2017) Organisational failure and turnaround in public sector organisations:  a systematic review of the evidence, Medical Journal of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 31.76.