High Court strikes out wide-ranging claim against schools, headteachers and public sector bodies
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The High Court has struck out the entirety of a £2.8m claim brought by a child and his mother against a London borough, a number of schools, an NHS trust, a housing association and others arising from the child’s education, health and recreational services.
Clare Padley, sitting as Deputy High Court Judge, concluded that the claimants did not have reasonable grounds for bringing their pleaded claim.
She said: “This is a clear example of a case in which to allow the continuance of these proceedings beyond this point would be without any possible benefit to the claimants and would waste resources on both sides and be an inappropriate use of the court's resources.”
The judgment followed a hearing last month of four strike out/summary judgment applications made by the various defendants in the case.
The first claimant (C1) has an Education, Health and Care Plan (EHCP). His diagnoses include autism, ADHD, PTSD and anxiety disorder.
His mother brought claims on his behalf as his litigation friend and also claimed in her own right.
The defendants included the head teachers of two schools, the governing bodies of schools attended by the boy, the University Schools Trust, the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, East London NHS Foundation Trust, Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd (trading as Poplar HARCA), and the London Legacy Development Corporation.
The judge said: “All the named defendants appear to be either linked to schools which C1.... has previously attended or are public bodies or other organisations which have been involved in some way with the provision of educational, health or recreational services to C1. As can be seen, some of the defendants are individuals who have been sued in a personal capacity.”
The claimants brought claims in negligence and personal injury; discrimination, harassment and victimisation under the Equality Act 2010; defamation; and breaches of human rights under Articles 3, 8, 14 and Article 2 Protocol 1 ECHR (via the Human Rights Act 1998).
They said that the first claimant had been unlawfully excluded from education since September 2025 and was "wholly without suitable educational provision". It was also submitted that the mother, as parent-carer, had "suffered direct harm, including stress and anxiety materially increasing her risk of serious health consequences, including stroke".
The claimants sought damages, declarations, injunctions and other remedies. Interim relief was also "sought by separate N244 application to secure urged educational provision for first claimant pending trial”.
The defendants relied on a number of grounds in their applications to have the claim struck out, including that some parts of the claim were not within the jurisdiction of High Court – including all the claims brought under the Equality Act 2010, by reason of s. 114 EA 2010.
Clare Padley concluded amongst other things that the High Court had no jurisdiction to hear any of the claims brought by the claimants under EA 2010.
She also found that any EA 2010 claims based on facts prior to 17 March 2025, even if not struck out under section 114, would be time-barred in any event; and all the claims made under the Human Rights 1998 relating to events which took place prior to 17 September 2024 againts all defendants were also time-barred and must be struck out.
The claimant's argument that the pleaded claim concerned a “continuing course of conduct” was unsuccessful.
Padley briefly set out her conclusions on the merits of the claims made against multiple defendants under the HRA.
She said she was “satisfied that on the basis of the case pleaded in the POC [Particulars of Claim], the claimants have no reasonable grounds for bringing any of the claims under HRA, and the remaining claims which are not time-barred must be struck out in any event.”
Claims for “stigmatisation” were struck out because this was not a recognised cause of action. “To the extent that these parts of the claim appear to be an alternative way of pleading a claim for defamation, then the claim does not comply with CPR 53,” the judge added.
In relation to allegations of misfeasance in public office, Padley found the claimants had failed to properly identify all the requisite ingredients of such a claim in the POC against all the defendants, and in particular, the motive and knowledge elements and whether targeted or untargeted malice was relied upon.
“Furthermore, I am satisfied that even if the pleadings were amended to correct these shortcomings, and the version of facts relied on by the claimants were accepted, these claims are bound to fail on the basis of those pleaded facts when the appropriate Three Rivers test is applied, whether in relation to targeted or untargeted malice.”
Concluding the case, the judge directed that the entire Particulars of Claim should be struck out under CPR 3.4, and that the claim should be dismissed against all defendants.
Finally, she added: “Nothing in this judgment is intended to minimise the challenges faced by C2 in her day-to-day role as a mother and carer for C1. I note that Mr Midwinter KC [in previous proceedings] encouraged the parties to adopt a more positive and collaborative approach to addressing C1's future needs rather than engaging in litigation. I can only echo his sentiments.”
Lottie Winson



