Legal challenge to second Carmarthenshire school closure rejected by High Court

In ST, R (On the Application Of) v Carmarthenshire County Council [2026] EWHC 2038 (Admin) (04 August 2026), Judge Keyser KC concluded that, taking into account the “reality of the situation”, the school is “unlikely to have sustainable viability” and “accounts for a markedly disproportionate share of the resources within the defendant's stretched education budget”.

The judicial review claim concerned the council’s decision on 4 March 2026 (the Decision) to discontinue Ysgol Llansteffan (the School) from 31 August 2026, and to re-designate and include the catchment area of the school within the existing catchment area of Ysgol Llangain from 1 September 2026.

The claimant was a pupil at the School.

In June this year, the High Court rejected another claim against Carmarthenshire County Council regarding school closure plans, while agreeing that the council had a case to answer over the claim that they had not given proper and timely consideration to alternative proposals other than closing Ysgol Meidrim – a primary school for 4 to 11-year-olds in the village of Meidrim.

In the present case against the proposed closure of Ysgol Llansteffan, three grounds of challenge were submitted:

1. the defendant unreasonably made its decision on the basis of financial information that was out of date;
2. the defendant failed to recognise that a decision to close the School required that there be a "strong case" for closure;
3. the defendant breached the socio-economic duty in section 1 of the Equality Act 2010.

Following a rolled-up hearing, HHJ Keyser KC refused permission on all grounds.  

On ground 1, he said: “Ground 1 is to the effect that the financial advantages of closure were repeatedly identified as a material factor, […] but the financial information that informed the Decision was materially misleading in several respects.

“The principal question […] is whether the defendant's decision-making process reveals a material error of fact, or misunderstanding, or methodological flaw. In my judgment, it clearly does not.”

Turning to ground 2, the judge observed that a decision-maker will be acting on the basis of the legal requirement for a "strong case" for closure if:

(a) it starts from the presumption against closure;

(b) it follows, in addition to other requirements, the requirements of section 1.8 regarding the identification of challenges, the consideration of alternatives, the formulation of reasons, and (where appropriate) the consultation, as well as the requirements of section 5.4 regarding the consideration of objections; and

(c) it makes its decision on the basis that, after doing all these things, it is satisfied that implementation of the proposal is the most appropriate response.

He said: “That is what the defendant did. Accordingly, the defendant made no error as to the correct legal test.”

Lastly, refusing permission on ground three, the judge concluded that the complaint of a breach of the socio-economic duty in the case was “not arguable”.

Looking at the issue of delay, the judge observed that even if he had accepted the grounds advanced by the claimant, he would have granted permission but refused to make a quashing order for the following reasons:

“1) There was undue delay. The Decision was made on 4 March 2026 and the Decision Letter was dated 5 March 2026. The claim was issued on 15 May 2026, which is about two months and one week later. That is within the 3-month longstop period, but in the circumstances of this case I do not regard it as prompt.

2) The difficulty caused by a quashing order in these proceedings is evident from a consideration of the timeline. The order for a rolled-up hearing was made on 16 June 2026. The hearing took place on 23 July 2026, the earliest available date. This judgment was made available in draft on 30 July 2026, one month before final implementation of the Decision.

3) The witness statement of Mr Carter (the defendant's Schools Transformation and Change Manager) states that, if the claim were to succeed, it is unlikely that the School would be operationally viable for the start of term on 1 September 2026. The employed teacher at the School has accepted an offer of employment in another school within the county, with a start-date of 1 September 2026. The School would therefore be reliant on agency staff. […] The head teacher has undertaken much of the administrative work required for the closure, such as terminating contracts for such things as photocopiers or transferring them to another school. In truth, the reorganisation is now largely complete. To attempt to undo it would be to invite chaos, disruption and considerable expenditure and would create the risk that the School would remain open but incapable of adequate functioning in September.

4) The order for a rolled-up hearing also refused an application for interim relief. If I may respectfully say so, I agree that the refusal of interim relief and the direction for a rolled-up hearing was the entirely correct way of dealing with the matter in the circumstances. An order for interim relief would have been inappropriate.

5) Mr Howells (for the Claimant) submitted that these problems were largely due to the defendant's own conduct and that they could now be avoided or at least mitigated. He observed that the claimant first put the defendant on notice of the prospective challenge 15 days after the Decision and that the defendant took 34 days to give a full response. I was not referred to the correspondence. But the fact is that, if a challenge needs to be brought urgently, it must be brought urgently. Mr Howells noted that the teacher's application for employment in another school was made on 1 May 2026 and the employment was accepted on 8 May 2026. While true, this does not address the difficulty occasioned by a challenge that would, if successful as to remedy, result in a quashing order during the summer vacation and less than one month before the start of the new term.

6) I take into account, also, what I regard as the reality of the situation. Even if (as I do not accept) the defendant's Decision is open to the criticisms made of it, it resulted from serious and obvious concerns and a detailed and generally compliant process. […] Whatever may be the precise figures at any particular point in time, the School is unlikely to have sustainable viability and accounts for a markedly disproportionate share of the resources within the defendant's stretched education budget. The defendant has given serious consideration to these matters, even if (as I do not accept) its Decision was flawed."

Owen Prys Lewis of 9 Park Place Chambers acted on behalf of the defendant council.