High Court rejects challenge to proposed closure of children’s centres

In JO, R (On the Application Of) v London Borough of Ealing [2026] EWHC 886 (Admin) (15 April 2026), Mr Justice Kimblin dismissed the appeal brought by the parents of a two-year-old child, concluding that “the consultation was undertaken [by the council] at a sufficiently, and lawfully, formative stage”.

The hearing examined the duties of local authorities in relation to children’s centres and looked at the stage at which it is appropriate to consult on cuts to provision.

The case concerned JO, a two-year-old child living in Ealing. JO and her parents had relied on the services provided by the centres due to close since JO was nine weeks old.

The council had consulted on new arrangements for some of its children's services. The claimant took part in the consultation on the future provision of children's centres in Ealing.

The section on 'Financial Impact' stated:

"A strong and improved Early Help offer is expected to produce better outcomes for children and families and is a preventative service to avoid more costly social care intervention therefore avoiding future demand and costs.

“Focusing our offer across a smaller number of children's centres, while expanding our outreach offer, will allow for a more efficient service model, through a combination of reduction in costs and increase in rental income.

“[…] Children's Services have a robust savings target of £11.819m for 2025/26 as part of the MTFS [Medium Term Financial Strategy] agreed by Cabinet in February 2025, which aims to ensure the financial resilience of the council. This proposal supports delivery of a savings target of £751k by 2026/27. There will be part-delivery of some savings in 2025/26 however due to the timing of implementation the full impact will not be felt until 2026/27."

Over 2,300 people responded to the consultation. The judge observed that “most were strongly opposed to the proposed measures.”

The consultation led to the decision of the Council's Cabinet on 11 June 2025 to approve the Improved Early Help Offer and Early Help Strategy 2025-2028 (the decision).

The claimant sought the quashing of the decision, or a declaration that it was unlawful.

The High Court determined the following three issues:

1. Was the consultation undertaken at a sufficiently formative stage, or not?
2. Were sufficient reasons and information given for the proposals to allow for intelligent consideration and response, including whether the decision was unlawful due to process irrationality? [Issues i and ii encompassed the elements of Ground 1].
3. Did the Defendant comply with its duty under section 5A(1) Childcare Act 2006 (sufficient provision of children's centres to meet local need)? [Issue iii encompassed Grounds 2 and 4. Ground 3 was not pursued].

The judge noted: “A key part of the Claimant's case is the 'Budget and Medium Term Financial Strategy' ('MTFS') of 12th February 2025. Part of her case is that financial decisions drove the impugned decisions.”

Turning to issue i, the judge said: “The Claimant commences her attack by reference to the MTFS: the Strategic Director could amend the funding proposals, but the starting point had been determined. [judge’s emphasis]

“The Claimant's case is that the consultation was defective from the start because there was a pre-existing decision to save £750,000 by closing children's centres. It was also not at its formative stage because some options had been eliminated from consideration. These two flaws made the consultation unfair at the outset.”

Analysing the arguments, he said: “Change to service provision in respect of children's services, as for many other types of service, is necessarily iterative and has to start somewhere. The fact that there is a process of budgeting for the extensive range of services to be provided is the product of the Council's budgetary duties and not an indicator that funding is the sole determinant of future provision. Moreover, there is nothing in the report, the reasons nor the supporting detailed budgetary tables which suggests that there was a financial fetter, save that there were overall constraints in balancing the budget. It does not limit alternatives but expressly leaves open the question of alternative approaches.”

He continued: “The budgetary process was not a thing that was done which required prior consultation by reason of s. 5D(1)c of the 2006 Act. This is because 'the thing' had not been 'done'. Rather, it was proposed and was the subject of consultation. The discretion afforded to the Council is wide, as explained by Andrews J in the Buckinghamshire case. Budgetary decisions are likely to be preliminary in nature, as was held in both the Oxfordshire and Lancashire cases. In my judgment, this budgetary decision as made by the Council in this case was not intended to be, and was not, something which went beyond budgeting. It was a compilation of budgetary proposals across the Council's areas of activity and responsibility. Indeed, it would be surprising if the Council did not undertake this work at the outset, not least because the Council was required to set its fees, charges, council tax and business rates.

“It is not correct that the Council's financial planning impaired the consultations which the Claimant and others participated in. In my judgment, that finding is reinforced by what happened after the consultation, namely that three children's centres were added back into the proposal, as a result of the analysis which was undertaken of the consultation responses. I accept that is not the extent of change which many objectors were seeking, but it is nevertheless strong evidence that the consultation was conducted on a genuine basis and that the outcome was not pre-determined by the MTFS.”

The claimant also contended that the consultation was unfair by reason of “the absence of alternatives”.

Considering this, the judge said: “I do not accept these arguments because: (1) the consultation questionnaire invited consultees to contribute alternative options. I do not consider that a consultation will generally be unlawful for taking this approach. It is an open invitation to others to take part in the process of settling on solutions to the issues which present themselves; (2) public law objections on the basis of alternatives are inherently fact-sensitive. Those who object to the outcome will usually have a variant to promote. Of itself, the existence of a variant or a wholly different solution to an issue does not indicate illegality. Consultation is an opportunity to communicate to the decision maker. The case law on when discarded options must be included in a consultation, or at least referred to in the consultation documents, pulls in different directions, reflecting the fact that fairness in this context is highly fact-sensitive.

“In so far as the authorities conflict on issues of principle, the leading authority is Moseley (see Lang J. in R (Possible) v Secretary of State for Transport [2026] Env LR 2 at [129]; (3) a preferred option will often be in play, but that does not make the consultation unlawful providing the consultation materials are not misleading: Sardar v Watford BC [2006] EWHC 1590 (Admin) at [29]. To have a stated preferred option may assist consultees in providing focussed responses on the merits of that preference.”

“For these reasons, I find that the consultation was undertaken at a sufficiently, and lawfully, formative stage.”

The judge then considered whether the council's consultation gave sufficient reasons to allow for intelligent consideration and response.

He found the description of the proposal, the related explanation and the reference to the guiding principles to be adequate material on which to consult.

He said: “The thrust of the consultation was in respect of a change to the balance of the provision of children's services with a smaller number of children's centres and greater outreach. In my judgment, that was clearly and sufficiently explained in the consultation document and in the other consultation materials, such as the questionnaire and the materials which were presented at consultation meetings. That information enabled reasons to be given by consultees to explain why the proposal should be varied. It enabled the provision of more information, i.e. evidence, for the Council to consider in preparing the next iteration of its proposals. The consultation produced a two-way flow of information, which is the essence of the process. This is consistent with Sullivan L.J.'s characterisation of consultation in Baird ...... I do not find there to have been any material inhibition to that process taking place which would offend the second Gunning requirement.”

Ground 1 was therefore rejected.

Turning to the final issue of ‘compliance with the Childcare Act 2006 – the sufficiency duty’, the judge noted that counsel for the claimant “particularly emphasised” guidance not to close a children's centre unless it can be demonstrated that outcomes for children would not be adverse and that there would be sufficient centres to meet local needs.

Counsel for the claimant submitted that the evidence to meet this guidance was not produced by the council and so there were gaps which made the decision irrational.

She submitted that the matters in ss. 1 and 3 of the 2006 Act are mandatory considerations.

The judge said: “I agree that the Council was to have regard to the purposes within ss. 1 and 3 of the 2006 Act. I find that it is clear from material which preceded the proposal that the Council was addressing its mind to how to achieve those purposes. It is similarly clear from the consultation documents and from the reasons given for the decision, which include the reasons given in the report to Cabinet.

“First, the Council obtained evidence of the value of a place-based model for meeting families in places in which they were comfortable. Some parts of the community are hard to reach. The Council was directing its mind to how to address the purposes of the 2006 Act for those parts of the community. This was backed up by the CSA; the sufficiency assessment which identified gaps in availability, affordability and geography.

“Second, these points were taken forward in the January report and the need for redesign. This resulted in a combined consultation on Early Years Help generally, and children's centres specifically.

“Thirdly, the decision is more than a decision on children's centres. It is expressly concerned with a combination of children's centre provision and other modes of meeting the purposes of the 2006 Act, and strengthened outreach.”

Dismissing grounds 2 and 4, Mr Justice Kimblin concluded: “The Claimant has identified no obvious logical error nor mistake of fact which would permit this court to intervene. There are no gaps in the analysis, and the outcome is one which, in my judgment, is plainly open to the Council having regard to the purposes of the 2006 Act, its associated guidance and the combination of means which the Council identified as the solution which it wished to adopt. There were undoubtedly other solutions which would also be lawful and which some people would prefer, however that is not territory into which this court may venture.”

The claim was dismissed.

Lottie Winson