High Court rejects legal challenge to DfE refusal to extend free school meals to Charedi private school pupils

In CKS & Ors, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for Education [2026] EWHC 741 (Admin) (27 March 2026), Mr Justice Mansfield concluded that the Secretary of State for Education was entitled to regard Charedi parents as “exercising a choice”, and entitled to have regard to that choice in making her decision about the request to extend UIFSM.

He said: “The English state-funded school system provides education to children of all religious and cultural minorities. […] The state funds not only maintained schools, which themselves cater for a wide range of cultural and religious backgrounds, but also voluntary aided schools, many of which are faith based – indeed a number of those are Jewish faith based.

“The Claimant families could send their children to those schools. Or the schools which they attend could seek to become voluntary aided. That they do not do so is a matter of choice. While that choice may be based on strong religious and cultural preference it is, nonetheless, a choice.”

The UIFSM policy requires state-funded schools to provide a free school meal to all pupils in state-funded schools in Reception and Key Stage 1 on a non-means-tested basis. It does not apply to private schools.

The three claimants in the case were members of the Charedi Jewish community, who attend private schools. They do not receive meals pursuant to UIFSM because they do not attend state-funded schools.

However, the Charedi community has been recognised to have high levels of deprivation.

Representatives of the community had sought to persuade the Secretary of State for Education (the defendant) to extend UIFSM to include Charedi pupils. However, the defendant declined to do so.

The claimants challenged the defendant's refusal on three grounds:

Ground 1 - the defendant's refusal was discriminatory on grounds of their religion or race, contrary to article 14 European Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention") read with articles 8, 9 and article 2 of Protocol 1 ("A2P1").
Ground 2 – there had been a breach of the public sector equality duty ("PSED") found in s.149 Equality Act 2010.
Ground 3 – there had been a failure to adequately and rationally take into account the position of Charedi children.

Before turning to the individual grounds, Mr Justice Mansfield noted: “The claimants sought to argue that UIFSM is essentially a welfare benefit that is merely delivered through the mechanism of a school meal; it was therefore different from the other aspects of state provision of education.

“I do not accept that. The provision of a free meal at school is part of the fabric of state education provision: it is a policy designed to affect the learning outcomes and behaviours of pupils in schools for which the state has a funding and regulatory responsibility.”

The claimants relied on three witness statements of Motty Pinter. Mr Pinter is the Director of Communal Affairs at Chinuch UK, the organisation representing strictly Orthodox Jewish schools across the UK.

The judge said: “Mr Pinter provides much useful background information as to the Charedi community, the Chasidic group within that community, and the various sub-communities within the Chasidic group. He explained the economic circumstances of the community, and their schooling arrangements. His evidence included:

Attendance at an Orthodox Jewish school is not regarded as a choice but as an essential facet of Charedi families' identity and belief.
85% of Charedi infant age children attend private schools, with 15% attending state-funded schools.
There are no state-funded schools for primary age children in the relevant area that are "religiously acceptable". There are local Jewish primary state-funded schools, but because their intake includes many pupils from non-Jewish or non-observant Jewish backgrounds, they are not appropriate. Mr Pinter says Chasidic families' children require education in a Yiddish speaking and "culturally homogenous" environment.
Given current levels of antisemitism, Charedi families could not entertain the thought of their children attending mainstream schools, even if religious and cultural barriers were not present.
The Charedi community faces a high level of deprivation. Mr Pinter makes this point by reference to the evidence in two other cases – Z and ALR.... He also says that in recognition of the relatively high levels of poverty in the community, in 2023 the Mayor of London made £450,000 available to alleviate food insecurity in the Charedi communities in Hackney and Haringey.
Charedi private schools are in financially precarious positions.
Given the deprivation of the community and the financial position of the schools, Charedi private schools are in a different position to other private schools.”

Analysing ground 1, the judge said: “A central plank of the claimants' argument is that Charedi children are in need of state-funded school meals due to their economically marginal position. To make them available to those children would further two of the aims of the grant: to tackle child poverty and to support low-income families. In the claimants' submission, state-funded schools are merely the vehicle by which meals are delivered to children.

“Further, the distinction between state-funded and private has been blurred, because there are instances where UIFSM are provided to children in private schools. The claimants therefore argue that inclusion of Charedi school children within UIFSM is a 'less intrusive measure', in terms of interference with the claimants' rights, that could have been used to achieve the defendant's objectives.”

The judge did not accept that a less intrusive measure could have been adopted without compromising the achievement of the defendant's objectives.

He said: “First, as I have already indicated, I reject the characterisation that state-funded schools are merely a 'vehicle' by which meals are delivered to children. The scheme has a number of objectives which are expressly educational and address the life and culture of children within state-funded schools.

“Second, the fact that UIFSM are provided to some children in private schools does not assist the claimants. Those are children who are subject to Alternative Provision. Where children are subject to Alternative Provision the state provides funding for their education and the state has regulatory and monitoring responsibilities in relation to that education. Those children are not in a comparable position to the claimants, and the fact that they receive UIFSM does not detract from the 'bright line' nature of the scope of the policy.

“Third, given (i) that UIFSM is designed specifically to apply to state-funded schools and not private schools and (ii) that its objectives include educational objectives relevant to those schools, it is inevitable that any extension to the private sector would require significant redesign of the existing policy. I accept the defendant's submissions that the private school sector is less regulated and enjoys more autonomy. I also accept the defendant's evidence that if the scheme were to be extended, it would create considerable challenges in terms of data collection, administration and monitoring.

“Fourth, I accept the defendant's evidence as to potential cost consequences of a change. I accept the evidence of Ms Taylor [Director of the Educational Engagement, Access and Wellbeing Directorate within the Department of Education] that an extension of UIFSM would likely lead to a reduction in the benefit to all schools across the board.

“Fifth, any extension of UIFSM to the benefit of the claimants would give rise to problems of delineation. Were the claimants (or their schools) to be included within UIFSM, it would give rise to a very real risk of two types of delineation dispute:

i) There would be a real risk of claims for inclusion by other groups arguing that they should now be included if the Charedi schools are to be included.

ii) If the state were to fund access to free school meals to pupils in the private sector, it is difficult to see how that would not lead to arguments that the state should also fund other aspects of private schooling.”

The judge rejected the claim that the refusal to extend UIFSM to the claimants was contrary to article 14, thereby dismissing ground 1.

Turning to ground 2, the judge highlighted the key issues as follows:

i) Did the defendant discharge the PSED in exercising its function in relation to UIFSM?

ii) If the defendant failed to discharge the PSED, should the Court refuse relief in relation to Ground 2 pursuant to section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981?

Section 149(1) of the Equality Act 2010 provides:

“A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to—

(a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act;

(b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it;

(c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.”

The judge noted: “The PSED must be discharged prior to the decision being made. However, compliance with the PSED does not necessarily require a formal impact assessment to be undertaken: R (Sheak v Lambeth BC) [2021] EWHC 1745 (Admin).”

Considering whether the Secretary of State discharged the PSED, the judge said: “I accept the defendant's submissions that there was no breach of the PSED in this case. The defendant concedes that the determination of the Conditions of Grant was the exercise of a function to which the PSED applies. However:

i) The Conditions of Grant were in accordance with a long-settled policy, in place since 2014. I reject the claimants' submission that a full equality impact assessment needed to be carried out each year a grant is made to fund UIFSM. The challenge is, in reality, a challenge to the defendant's refusal to change its long-settled policy.

ii) The defendant gave specific consideration to the request made by the claimants to change the policy. That request expressly raised religious discrimination issues. In considering the request, it is plain that the defendant considered the equality issues raised by the claimants. The arguments were considered and rejected. In my judgment, the Ministerial Submission did more than have regard to 'general issues of equality' in the sense that phrase was used in Bracking.

iii) Annex B of the Ministerial Submission made express reference to the PSED. In circumstances where the decision under consideration was expressly about the equalities position of the claimants' group, further detailed consideration of the elements of the PSED would have added nothing material to the matters the defendant did consider.”

He added: “If I am wrong in my conclusion that there was no breach of the PSED, it is in my view highly likely that the same decision would have been reached in any event. Indeed, in my judgment it is plain and obvious that it would.”

At the beginning of the hearing, the judge allowed an application by the claimants to amend ground 3. The issues were therefore:

i) Did the defendant act unlawfully because it took into account its view that Charedi parents have a choice as to whether to send their children to private schools?

ii) Did the defendant act irrationally in considering that Charedi parents have such a choice?

Considering this, Mr Justice Mansfield concluded: “Given my conclusions on Ground 1, this ground can be addressed very briefly. I have set out my conclusions on the choice issue above. The Defendant was entitled to regard Charedi parents as exercising a choice and entitled to have regard to that choice in making her decision about the request to extend UIFSM. There was no flaw in the Defendant's reasoning. It was not irrational of the Defendant to have taken that view.

“More generally, for the same reasons which I have outlined in respect of justification under Ground 1, it cannot be said that the decision not to extend UIFSM was irrational.”

The application for judicial review was dismissed on all grounds.

Lottie Winson