Judge rejects application by father for injunction over plan of foster carers to move and send daughter to new school

In A Father v A Mother & Ors [2026] EWFC 26 (09 February 2026), Mrs Justice Knowles concluded: “Looking at matters of welfare in the round, the balance sheet is firmly in favour, in my view, of J moving with her foster carers and changing her secondary school. That holistic assessment means that I am satisfied that the local authority's decision making both safeguards and promotes J's welfare.”

The case concerned J, who is 11 years old. She is the subject of an interim care order and is in foster care.

In January 2026, her father issued an application for an order preventing the local authority moving J from her current secondary school or from a placement which allows her to remain at her school.

It was, however, planned that J would move in February 2026 with her current foster carers to another property about one and a half hours from her current placement.

Knowles J noted: “The distance is such that J will need to change her school and this is strongly opposed by the father.”

Outlining the background to the case, the High Court judge said the care proceedings in respect of J began in June 2024, when she was removed from the care of her father.

She became the subject of an interim care order that month and has lived with her current foster carers since.

HHJ ‘X’ conducted a fact-finding hearing in the summer of 2025 and made findings about the father's conduct.

She found that (a) the father, who is a teacher, targeted two friends of J's (girls of the same age as J) and used his position as J's father to foster and maintain an inappropriately close emotional connection with each girl, with the intention of carrying out sexual abuse; (b) the father initiated physical contact with each girl for the purpose of his own gratification and touched them in ways which were sexually motivated; and (c) the father had a sexual interest in young girls.

The father applied for permission to appeal HHJ X's fact-finding judgment but this was refused in January 2026 by Lord Justice Baker.

J started secondary school in September 2025.

Knowles J noted: “She is making good educational progress and appears to be a child who wants to do well at school and is interested in the educational opportunities available to her. Her secondary school is widely acknowledged to be an excellent school with an outstanding grading from Ofsted.”

In late October 2025, the local authority informed the parties that J’s foster carers had purchased a new home but, for the present time, intended to maintain both their existing property and their newly purchased home. In the future, it was said that they may move to the new property.

However, within a month, the foster carers' plans had changed and, in November 2025, the local authority informed the parties' legal representatives by email that the foster carers were in fact planning to move to their newly purchased property in the New Year and that J would move to a new secondary school closer to their home (School A).

The father's opposition to J's proposed change of school was ventilated at a hearing before HHJ X in November 2025, the circuit judge to whom the care proceedings had been allocated.

By the time of another hearing before HHJ X the next month, the foster carers had agreed to delay their move to the February half-term. If a move was inevitable, the father was in favour of J attending a different school – School B – in the area where the foster carers were to reside.

The children's guardian spoke with J in December 2025. She presented her with five possible options, including changing her foster home.

Knowles J noted: “J was very clear indeed that she wanted to stay with her current foster carers, knowing this meant a change of school and that it might mean a further change of school and placement if the court decided she should live with one of her parents. J talked with enthusiasm about the foster carers' new home and the guardian assessed her attachment to her present carers as strong. J's wishes and feelings on this issue have also been expressed to the social worker in similar terms on a number of occasions.”

Following the issue of the father's application, the parties appeared before HHJ X when directions to facilitate the hearing before Knowles J were given.

At the hearing, the father confirmed that he invited the court to make an order that J should not be moved from her present school to School A.

The local authority, supported by the mother and the children's guardian, invited Knowles J to dismiss the application for an injunction on the basis that the decision to move J from her current school was in her “best interests”.

Analysing the case, Knowles J said: “Dealing with two matters of process first, the case law makes plain that parental decision-making can be overridden by a local authority where a child is subject to an interim care order. The father suggested that the change to J's school place pre-determined any decision which the HHJ X might make at the final welfare hearing in June 2026. I find that an unpersuasive submission because HHJ X will – as all judges should when coming to a decision about a child's welfare in public law proceedings – undertake a holistic analysis of the realistic options for J's care.

“That requires a careful scrutiny of the advantages and disadvantages of each option, alongside judicial findings about the welfare checklist as it applies to J. J's schooling will be but one part of the matters which the court will need to consider at that stage and, in the circumstances of this case, I doubt very much it will be determinative of the final welfare decision reached by HHJ X.”

She continued: “Second, the father asserted that there had been inadequate consultation with him about the change of school. I found it necessary to ask a number of searching questions of the local authority to establish the chronology of the decision making process as this was poorly addressed in its written material. This resulted in additional material being sent to me via email during the hearing which shed light on events.

“The local authority had alerted the parties to a possible move by the foster carers in late October 2025 but very shortly before the hearing [in] November 2025, the foster carers' plans changed and it became clear that, if J was to stay with them, she would likely need to move school. That issue was notified to the parties, all of whom were legally represented, a week before the hearing together with information about School A. The court then embarked on the process of obtaining information about the proposed move and J was spoken to by the children's guardian. That process also allowed the father to express a preference for School B over School A.

“Though the local authority appeared committed to School A, it nevertheless sought advice via the relevant Virtual Schools about each option once it became clear that the foster carers were prepared to delay their move to the February 2026 half-term holiday. That consultation resulted in School A being affirmed as the educational provisions which best met J's needs as a child in the interim care of the local authority. Whilst it might have been ideal if the local authority had held a meeting with the parents away from the court setting to discuss the move and the change of school, it was operating within tight timescales and had done its best to notify the parties and to consider an alternative to School A. I find the local authority consulted with the parents as far as was reasonably practicable.”

Turning to matters of J's welfare, Knowles J acknowledged that the proposed move by the foster carers has some “potentially adverse consequences for J”.

She said: “Her present school is an excellent school which offers a high standard of education from which J is likely to benefit. Remaining at her present school provides continuity for J who is settled there and has formed new friendships. A move will disrupt the logistics of contact and most likely reduce the opportunity for J to have the same level of contact with her father. Finally, the care proceedings remain unresolved and this move would be a major change in J's circumstances.”

However, Knowles J also found factors in favour of the proposed move.

She said: “A change of school would allow J to remain with her current foster carers where she is settled and happy. A change of foster home would be much more harmful to J emotionally than a change of school especially in circumstances where there are no suitable in-house foster placements available. J would thus require an agency placement, potentially out of borough, and would likely have to change school in any event. J's current carers are committed to her and are willing to care for her long-term if she cannot return to the care of either of her parents. They represent a chance of long-term stability for her if she has to remain a child in care. It is not practical for J to remain with her current carers and stay in her present school.”

She continued: “J has stated firmly to her social worker and her children's guardian that she wishes to move with her foster carers and accepts this means a change of school. She is a child of nearly 12 years whose views have some weight in my decision making. They are not, however, decisive as J will not be aware of many of the factors in these proceedings which bear on the decision I am required to make. I reject the father's contention that J's views are not authentically her own.”

Refusing the father's application for an injunction under the inherent jurisdiction, Knowles J concluded: “Standing back, and looking at matters of welfare in the round, the balance sheet is firmly in favour, in my view, of J moving with her foster carers and changing her secondary school. That holistic assessment means that I am satisfied that the local authority's decision making both safeguards and promotes J's welfare.”

Lottie Winson