Post-adoption contact and the role of adopters’ views

In the matter of Prospective Adopters v A[1], His Honour Judge Parker in the Liverpool Family Court considered an application on behalf of the mother (an adult lacking capacity and represented through the Official Solicitor) for post adoption contact with her daughter B aged two years and eight months. Care and placement orders had been granted by the same judge in October 2024 where the judgment acknowledged that there was no risk of mother destabilising an adoptive placement but did not identify direct contact as being a fundamental requirement of the care plan. B had been placed with the proposed adopters since July 2024. There had been a break in direct contact. However, as things now stood, contact was agreed for four times a year; mother said that all should be face to face whereas the local authority and guardian were proposing one face to face, one video and two creative indirect visits.

Mother did not oppose the adoption but sought an order under section 51A Adoption and Children Act 2002. The adopters were opposed as they were committed to managing contact including some direct contact but would like the flexibility to adapt in line with B’s changing needs. While they understood the purpose and supported it, they were encountering ongoing issues with dysregulation after contact.

The Court upheld the principle from the judgment of McFarlane P in Re B (A Child) (Post-Adoption Contact)[2] (and drawn from previous case authority going back to 1989) that, notwithstanding s.51A and s51B ACA, the court should not, save in exceptional circumstances, consider imposing an order for contact upon adopters who were unwilling to accept it. The comments of the judge in the present case at paragraphs 16 and 26 are interesting, where dealing with submissions based upon the adopters’ agreement to contact being such an exceptional circumstance:

In my judgment if the Court were to accede to that submission the unintended consequences could be that adopters would be advised not to consent to any form of direct contact because in those circumstances that could be used to support the parents that there should be an order. In other words, a positive discouragement to potential adopters to agree to a form of direct contact albeit without an order intended. [16]

The simple fact that they agree to some direct contact, in addition to other video and indirect contact, does not make this an exceptional case in a way that justifies the imposition of an order, and I have already set out one example why that might be a dangerous step to take, with unintended consequences for other potential open adoptions. Even if I am wrong on any or all of that, having regard to the provisions of section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, I do not consider that an order is in B’s welfare interests, or that more direct contact at this stage is either. [26]

While this is a circuit judge decision and perhaps unsurprisingly, the judge declined, as invited by counsel for the mother, to depart from the current jurisprudence of 35 years, it is a useful reminder that, notwithstanding the greater willingness of the court to look at contact post adoption in the light of Re R and C (Adoption or Fostering)[3], the long-standing principle of not overruling the views of adopters has yet to be comprehensively overturned. It is, however, worth considering this against the dicta of Judge Lazarus in Re S (A Child) (Post-Adoption Contact)[4], where the judge commented at paragraphs 25 and 27:

25.  It is important to note that these recent cases enunciate the position at the point of considering the grant of a placement order, and therefore at the point of setting a template for any future prospective adopters, and which will all inevitably therefore come to be reviewed at the point when an adoption application is being considered. If those prospective adopters have shown their acknowledgement of and commitment to such a contact regimen as ordered under s26 then that should play heavily into the court’s consideration of whether a s51A order is necessary. Equally, if the LA has not sought or found prospective adopters who understand and accept that position, then that too is likely to affect the court’s analysis at the point that an adoption order is being sought.

27.  So while I accept the unchallenged overall approach applicable to s51A applications set out in Re B that it would be “extremely unusual” to impose a contact order on prospective adopters who do not agree to such an order, I however consider that it is now incumbent on the court to bear in mind the modern research and case law summarised above when reviewing the nature and quality of a disagreement of those prospective adopters to any contact order, and that it is not simply for the prospective adopters’ views to be taken at face value in influencing the exercise of the court’s appropriate discretion.

It should be noted, however, that the judge did not, on the facts of S, make a contact order under s51A either.

An example of a s.51A order being made where the adopters were willing to agree to contact appears in the judgement of McKendrick J in Re T (A Child) (Non-Agency Adoption)[5]. While the adopters do not have the “final say”, it would appear that the courts remain opposed to imposing contact against their opposition to it altogether. If they are in agreement with it, the courts remain highly reluctant to push them further than they are already prepared to go.

A further leading authority on this issue is surely likely at some point.

Graeme Bentley is a Principal Solicitor in Invicta Law’s Child Protection team, with over 40 years of experience in family law.

[1] Prospective Adopters v A [2026] EWFC 273 (B) | 6 Aug 2026

[2] Re B (A Child) (Post-Adoption Contact) [2019] EWCA Civ 29

[3] Re R and C (Adoption or Fostering) [2024] EWCA Civ 1302

[4] Re S (A Child) (Post-Adoption Contact), (also known as Prospective Adopters v M) [2026] EWFC 202 (B) [2026] 7 WLUK 438

[5] Re T (A Child) (Non-Agency Adoption) [2026] EWHC 391 (Fam)